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The United Kingdom has many bodies that play their part in carrying out the work of national eth-ics committees, but its nearest equivalent of the 
United States’ Presidential Commission for the Study of 
Bioethical Issues is the Nuffield Council on Bioethics, es-
tablished in 1991. The Council is charged with examining 
ethical questions raised by developments in biological and 
medical research, publishing reports, and making repre-
sentations to appropriate bodies in order to respond to or 
anticipate public concern. It is a nongovernment organiza-
tion with no defined or guaranteed channels of influence. 
Unlike the U.S. bioethics commission, it is not part of 
executive government, nor is it constituted to contrib-
ute to the legislative branch, as does the French Comité 
Consultatif National d’Ethique (National Consultative 
Ethics Committee). Its nongovernmental status notwith-
standing, the Nuffield Council’s work affects the U.K. 
government and the British public, and the Council has 
achieved international recognition for its reports. I was the 
chairperson from 2012 to 2017 and draw on my experi-
ence in this piece to consider three key audiences: govern-
ments, publics, and the international community.
Government
The Nuffield Council has no authority merely by vir-tue of the position it holds. Rather, it has established 
relational authority based on its reputation. A recent 
evaluation suggested that stakeholders perceive that our 
work is influential in a “quiet way” but usually takes some 
time to come to fruition.1 It was suggested that the coun-
cil shaped thinking and culture among opinion formers, 
but did not always communicate very accessibly, and its 
reports were reflective in style rather than providing pre-
cise recommendations that got quickly taken up. Almost 
all our reports do in fact include specific recommenda-
tions to specific bodies, with follow-up by the Council. 
However, responding to the recommendations is discre-
tionary. One policy-maker observed that we sometimes 
write recommendations as would a parliamentary select 
committee, even though we do not carry similar authority 
(p. 32). Despite this, our work has been directly influential 
in both executive and legislative actions. One recent and 
very clear example of its influence is the decision in the 
United Kingdom to make provision in law for the use of 
mitochondrial replacement therapies. 
We believe that our influence arises from our charac-
ter, our ways of working, and the quality of outputs. In 
a document titled Strategic Plan 2012-2016, we set out 
our values: an inclusive approach that hears all voices but 
scrutinizes them for coherence and rationality, thereby de-
veloping a position that is intellectually rigorous and con-
sistent with the best available evidence.2 Underpinning 
this approach are three core virtues that a national bioeth-
ics committee needs: independence, courage, and practical 
engagement.
Independence. The committee must not be behold-
en to, or under the influence of, others as it develops 
its conclusions or selects the topics that it will exam-
ine. For the Nuffield Council, this matters because two 
of its funders—the Medical Research Council and the 
Wellcome Trust—also fund research on the sort of tech-
nologies that bioethics commissions consider. Without 
independence, the Council could be accused of providing 
false assurance that the technologies are ethically accept-
able. While this is specific to Nuffield, the issue is relevant 
to all national bioethics committees in countries that seek 
to promote the advancement of science. A further impor-
tance of independence lies in the distinctive contribution 
that collective deliberation offers. Unless a national eth-
ics committee moves from an open mind to its conclu-
sions, it adds little to policy-making beyond what could be 
achieved by its members acting individually. A committee 
that merely re-presented preestablished views would fail to 
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We have not shied away from criticizing national policies, such as 
in relation to the use of biodata. Nor do we believe that respect for 
public opinion permits uncritical acceptance of it. 
add significant value. Independence of thought and action 
is therefore a key virtue that national bioethics committees 
should display.
Courage. The committee must be able to speak its mind. 
We have not shied away from criticizing national policies, 
such as in relation to the use of biodata.3 Nor do we be-
lieve that respect for public opinion permits uncritical ac-
ceptance of it. Respecting people means challenging them 
when we conclude that they are wrong, but on the basis of 
reason, not merely disagreement. At our report launches, 
this has sometimes led to vigorous debate with families per-
sonally affected by the matters at issue.4
Practical engagement. The committee must address cur-
rent policy positions, connect recommendations with pre-
vailing concepts and terminology, and facilitate discussion 
through round tables, workshops, and the development 
of follow-up position statements. Thus, our report Public 
Health: Ethical Issues (2017) adapted a Millian framework 
because of its fit with the contemporary anxiety about the 
“nanny state.” This offered hope of a constructive engage-
ment with opinion formers.5 Our report on biodata was 
followed up by written and oral evidence to a parliamentary 
committee and also a hosted workshop for the Department 
of Health.6 We engage in conversations, not just commen-
tary, and we use our past work to inform policy and public 
discussions even where we have not established a specific 
working party (as in our briefing note on Zika, issued in 
February 2016).7
The People
The Nuffield Council’s terms of reference from 1991 to 2017 included working “with a view to promot-
ing public understanding and discussion.”8 The Council 
has explored various approaches in this effort, including 
a video competition for young people and work with po-
ets, but it has not developed an account of how public en-
gagement connects with normative bioethical work. The 
excellent Bioethics for Every Generation,9 by the Presidential 
Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues, and the ex-
emplary openness and transparency that come from this 
commission’s constitutional status offer attractive models. 
However, two areas where the committees’ experiences di-
verge merit consideration. 
Addressing the past. Henry Beecher and Maurice Henry 
Pappworth exposed similar research misconduct in the 
United States and the United Kingdom. More recently, 
however, the United Kingdom has been concerned with 
the failure to do research, misconduct (a problem of com-
pliance, not moral uncertainty), and mistrust (especially 
in industry research). These challenges are different from 
those typically addressed by national bioethics committees 
because substantive moral questions are not the issue. The 
statutory remit of England’s Health Research Authority, 
which (amongst other functions) oversees research ethics 
committees, includes reinforcing prevailing ethical stan-
dards and promoting proportionality in research regula-
tion.10 The legislative assumption is that research ethics 
is reasonably stable but that regulation can be improved. 
Although it has the National Research Ethics Advisors 
Panel to assist its work, this is not constituted to operate as 
a national bioethics committee but to assist with ensuring 
that the practicalities of research regulation are consistent 
with generally accepted standards of research ethics.
The shadow of historic research scandals seems darker in 
the United States, and stronger acknowledgment of them 
may be required before national bioethical discussions 
can move on to focus on emerging questions. The report 
“Ethically Impossible” STD research in Guatemala, by the 
Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues, 
is an example of this in action.11 This sort of work has not 
been a function of the Nuffield Council on Bioethics, and 
could not easily be done by a nongovernment body, but it 
seems an important component of a comprehensive frame-
work of governance. The best U.K. comparison probably 
concerns an organ retention scandal that came to light in 
the 1990s.12 Tissue samples and organs had been kept after 
pediatric postmortem examination without the consent or 
knowledge of parents. This scandal led to a major public 
enquiry, creation of the Retained Organs Commission to 
oversee the institutional responses to the recommenda-
tions, and finally, a statutory regulator (the Human Tissue 
Authority) to administer the legislation that followed. This 
was therefore addressed as a service failure requiring inves-
tigation as a matter of public accountability and regulation 
rather than as a specifically bioethical issue. 
Bioethics governance should provide a process for truth 
and reconciliation in relation to past failures. However, na-
tional ethics committees may not be resourced or equipped 
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to carry out that kind of work, which requires detailed 
documentary analysis, judgments on personal responsibil-
ity and liability, and historical insight to avoid anachronis-
tic assessments. The U.K. approach to the organ retention 
scandal comprised three components that do not sit neatly 
with the way in which national bioethics commissions 
have usually operated: forensic investigation, administra-
tive oversight of transition to good practice, and regulatory 
oversight for the future. However, there are also benefits 
to using a national ethics committee for this work. The 
dignity conferred by a national committee enables a show 
of contrition on behalf of the nation, which is itself a sig-
nificant matter of justice.
Looking ahead. The origins of the Nuffield Council on 
Bioethics lie in an era of “hostility to science . . . based 
more than anything on fear and ignorance.”13 The Council 
was established “to identify and define ethical questions 
. . . in order to respond to, and to anticipate public con-
cern.”14 This position is associated with a “catch-up model” 
of public bioethics and science rushing ahead of public de-
liberation, ethical reflection, and regulation. 
The recent exploration of mitochondrial DNA replace-
ment therapies illustrates a different model. Scientists 
facilitated public consideration of these therapies well 
in advance of their availability, allowing for fifteen years 
of public discourse and ethical debate before clinical us-
age became technically possible. Through a 2008 amend-
ment to the United Kingdom’s Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act, regulation was put in place before a de-
cision was needed. And the desire to use the technology 
was driven by a partnership of affected families, research-
ers, and clinicians—not the exploitation of unsuspecting 
guinea pigs, but families demanding the opportunity to use 
innovative therapies. 
This scenario flips the Nuffield Council’s founding as-
sumptions on their head. As we put it, 
The question that parliamentarians must consider is not 
whether they would want to use this technology them-
selves, but whether there are good grounds to prevent af-
fected families from doing so. We believe that those who 
know what it is like to care for, and sometimes to lose, an 
extremely sick child are the people best placed to decide 
whether this technology is right for them, with medical 
advice and within the strict regulatory framework pro-
posed. They have been waiting for the science for long 
enough. They should not have to wait for the law to catch 
up.15
The case has come from the people, based on the right to 
benefit from science. National ethics committees are now 
concerned with the justification of regulation as well as the 
ethics of technologies, and patients are one of their audi-
ences. 
One implication of this “bottom-up” approach might 
be the enhanced role of the third branch of government. 
The U.K. Supreme Court recently suggested that human 
rights limit communal bioethical debate in favor of consti-
tutional liberty.16 Such judicial appropriation of bioethics 
has the potential to put issues beyond the constitutional 
competence of both executives and legislatures, and pre-
sumably also beyond that of national ethics committees. 
The judicial discourse privileges arguments about pro-
tection of the vulnerable over those about the dignity of 
human life and rules certain mainstream bioethical posi-
tions out of court.17 It has been argued that, in the United 
Kingdom, this activity has typically been amoral, in that it 
decides ethical issues by applying rules designed for quite 
different purposes.18 Any resemblance to bioethical reflec-
tion is coincidental.
Global Bioethics Governance? 
National ethics committees are country specific, yet many developments at the cutting edge of medicine 
and science are increasingly international in nature. The 
science of mitochondrial DNA therapies and genome ed-
iting techniques is discussed collaboratively, yet “official” 
bioethics discussions of the science are largely conducted in 
parallel, with separate reports and regulatory responses (al-
beit with some conversation between them). The Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Authority and the Nuffield 
Council have undertaken consultations and published re-
ports covering territory very similar to that explored by the 
U.S. National Academy of Medicine, for example.
Many issues, such as safety and effectiveness, are likely 
to raise the same considerations across nations. On these 
issues, working in parallel—each national bioethics com-
mission examining the science on its own—seems a wasted 
effort. Some other questions, however, may be seen differ-
ently in different societies, and for these issues, national 
bioethics commissions can ensure that the philosophical 
substance is debated and explored, providing more than 
conflict management and diplomacy. This kind of exam-
ination is required if bioethics governance is to be more 
than a response to moral disagreement—the challenge of 
pluralism. These disagreements must be worked through 
in a way that avoids mere relativism. 19 
Nuffield is working on two topics that raise global ques-
tions: the “rule” that germ-line gene therapies are inconsis-
tent with human dignity as that concept is understood in 
the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural 
Organization’s Declaration on Bioethics and Human 
Rights,20 and the rule—in this case, concrete legislation in 
the United Kingdom—that research on human embryos 
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should not be conducted on those that are fourteen or 
more days old. Although both rules are long established, 
they constrain scientific research that we now have reasons 
to think might be fruitful.
As a community of national ethics committees, we 
should work out whether there are sound moral arguments 
behind the current positions or whether they were no more 
than a consensus formulation that enabled the debate to be 
deferred to a future time. Perhaps that time is now.
The U.K. legislation links the fourteen-day rule with the 
appearance of the embryo’s primitive streak. The Warnock 
report, on which the legislation is based, suggested that this 
linkage met the need for a “precise decision” that could al-
lay public anxiety about research on embryos because the 
appearance of the primitive streak “marks the beginning of 
individual development”21 This scientific fact drew its nor-
mative significance from acceptance. The U.K. experience 
may plausibly be characterized as a compromise that has 
been stable because it remained broadly acceptable both 
to the interested publics and to scientists. The UNESCO 
Declaration has been the subject of academic critique, but 
it has endured as a document around which bioethics de-
bate can revolve. It could be described as philosophically 
problematic but practically useful. Together, we need to ask 
whether bioethics is a matter for harmonization on a global 
scale or national differentiation. 
I sometimes wonder whether the United Kingdom 
should be considered a rogue bioethics state—it has no for-
mal national bioethics committee and has not signed the 
European bioethics document, the Oviedo Convention. 
However, we take bioethics governance very seriously. The 
Nuffield Council seeks to display some distinctive vir-
tues—independence, courage, inclusiveness, openness, and 
a particular type of practical wisdom that is pragmatic but 
has integrity. We are pleased to share them with other effec-
tive national bioethics commissions. 
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